CryptoReal
CASE FILE — Nov 10, 2026

Mercado Bitcoin Hot Wallets Compromised in $48.6M Multi-Chain Breach

On October 27, Mercado Bitcoin submitted an application to Brazil’s central bank seeking approval to act as a regulated crypto broker and custodian, just six days prior to a significant security incident.

The CEO emphasized in public remarks that the company had prioritized security investments from the outset.

On November 2, an attacker successfully drained Mercado Bitcoin’s hot wallets spanning 11 different blockchains, subsequently targeting customer deposit addresses.

At 12:56 UTC, Mercado Bitcoin, Brazil’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, issued a statement indicating the incident was “identified and swiftly contained,” asserting that no customers were adversely impacted. See official statement.

However, the sweep of Ethereum deposit addresses had already been ongoing for over 30 minutes, ultimately continuing for another four hours.

By 16:56 UTC, a total of 36,042 Ethereum deposit addresses had signed away their balances to the attacker. Bitquery’s analysis estimates $48.6 million in losses across 11 chains.

Bitquery’s on-chain investigation also found that funds had flowed to the same attacker address from wallets linked to BitMart, beginning 53 minutes before the Mercado Bitcoin theft began.

If the incident was contained, why did deposit addresses continue to sign transfers?

Credit: lets money, bitquery, The Record, Mercado Bitcoin, Pablo Sabbatella, Paolo Ardoino, Emmett Gallic, Times Brasil, Chainalysis, Bitget, Binance, Arkham, Sheldon, BitMart, CoinDesk, CoinTelegraph, exame

Tether’s intervention preceded Mercado Bitcoin’s first public disclosure.

At 10:21 UTC on November 2, Tether froze the attacker's USDT0 on Polygon, following up an hour later by freezing USDT on Tron and Ethereum. Mercado Bitcoin’s own announcement would not be posted for another two and a half hours.

The breach itself began even earlier: between 06:24 and 06:48 UTC, Mercado Bitcoin’s hot wallets across ten blockchains paid out to the attacker.

On Ethereum, 188 transactions transferred $29.5 million within a 24-minute window. The sequence began with 2,852 ETH, followed by USDT, USDC, and a range of other tokens, including small-value assets.

Hypernative flagged over $40 million in suspicious activity on at least ten chains.

According to an alert shared by Opsek founder Pablo Sabbatella, these were standard transfers, not the result of a smart contract exploit. The method by which the attacker obtained signing rights remains unknown.

No complex on-chain vulnerability was observed—just the exchange’s wallets transferring out funds.

On Ethereum, the stolen assets remained dormant for about five hours.

Shortly after noon UTC, 2,800 ETH were shifted to a new wallet, and by 12:27, customer deposit addresses began systematically transferring their balances to the attacker.

The exchange issued a public update 29 minutes later.

“We identified and swiftly contained a security incident in one of our systems early this morning,” Mercado Bitcoin posted at 12:56 UTC, adding that customers suffered no losses and there was no data breach. Deposits and withdrawals were halted as a safety measure.

At 14:24 UTC, the exchange published five addresses linked to the attacker on Twitter, spanning EVM-compatible blockchains, Bitcoin, Solana, Stellar, and Tron, “for identification and tracking.”

Tracking efforts were already active. Paolo Ardoino of Tether confirmed that “Tether froze more than 4.5M USDT related to this security incident.”

Arkham’s Emmett Gallic put the running total at ‘$46M stolen and growing.’

In a follow-up, Gallic wrote: “The Mercado Bitcoin Hacker is still sweeping thousands old deposit addresses.” “Not leaving a dollar behind.”

At 16:56 UTC, the Ethereum deposit sweep concluded. Bitquery counted 36,042 addresses, around four hours after the exchange’s statement about swift containment.

By that evening, Mercado Bitcoin’s messaging evolved.

The focus shifted from what had occurred to what customers could expect: the initial phrase “no harm to customers” was followed by an assurance that clients “will not suffer any loss of assets.” The first statement denied customer impact; the latter promised restitution.

On Twitter, the exchange estimated the affected assets at roughly $38 million, with $11 million frozen in conjunction with Tether, Circle, Paxos, BRL1, and Chainalysis.

That same evening, Times Brasil cited a company figure near $49 million impacted, with $11.2 million blocked.

Chainalysis’s early report also estimated about $49 million lost, noting the attacker’s activity across 17 blockchains.

Two estimates, one platform, a single night—this discrepancy would resurface later.

While hot wallets are naturally designed for outgoing transfers, draining thousands of deposit addresses required a broader capability: either possession of their private keys or access to the signing mechanism.

Who authorized 36,042 addresses to transfer funds to an unknown party?

Two Levels of Control

Bitquery describes the custody arrangement as follows: Customers are provided unique deposit addresses; deposits are credited to their accounts, and the assets are eventually consolidated into hot wallets used for withdrawals.

The private keys to deposit addresses are always under the exchange’s control, not the customer’s.

This setup requires protecting two separate domains: the withdrawal system for hot wallets, and the key material for every deposit address issued.

On November 2, the attacker was able to initiate transactions from both types of wallets.

Bitquery identified a key distinction: the large Bitcoin transfer from Mercado Bitcoin’s hot wallet resembled the exchange’s standard payout process.

In contrast, the Bitcoin deposit sweeps did not: they used different software and incurred much higher fees.

One transaction pattern mirrored the exchange’s own internal systems acting for the attacker; the other suggested someone outside those systems signing transactions independently.

Bitquery’s assessment is that the pattern matches access to both the exchange's payout system and the deposit keys, while noting that blockchain data alone cannot confirm the method.

The scale of the deposit sweeps illustrates the value of such signing control.

Each of the 36,042 Ethereum deposit addresses individually signed a transfer of its remaining balance. Later in the process, the attacker even used deposit addresses with residual ETH to pay transaction fees for others, ensuring all tokens could be withdrawn.

This was a meticulous process for relatively small returns. Bitquery identified that around 91% of these addresses held less than $10 each, with the 113 addresses over $100 accounting for 61% of the $266,000 total.

The Ethereum hot wallet lost $29.5 million in just 24 minutes, while deposit addresses yielded under 1% of that across more than four hours.

The pattern extended beyond Ethereum. Fifty-three Bitcoin deposit addresses were emptied. On BNB Chain, 143 addresses paid the attacker from 14:26 UTC, and a wallet associated with the exchange (previously consolidating funds from 1,483 deposit addresses) transferred $124,000 by 18:08 UTC.

On Base, 308 deposit addresses sent assets to a new attacker wallet in three minutes that evening, nearly five hours after the “swift containment” announcement.

If the attacker had access to the master key used to derive deposit addresses (as Bitquery notes is common for exchanges), the exposure could reach beyond the already-drained addresses.

This is why the timeline is important: disabling a payment processing system stops new requests but cannot mitigate risk if the attacker already possesses private keys.

The attacker’s preparations began on November 1, with the Ethereum address first funded that evening, shortly followed by the Tron address. Two small wallets tested the Ethereum address before funding the Tron address, implying a single operator coordinated both.

However, blockchain data alone cannot reveal the precise method of compromise.

The transactions confirm valid signatures from both hot wallets and thousands of deposit addresses. They do not indicate whether keys were exfiltrated, a signing service was subverted, a wallet management system was breached, or if insider or vendor involvement occurred.

Mercado Bitcoin characterized the incident as affecting “one of our systems.” As of November 9, the exchange had not disclosed the precise system compromised, the attacker’s method of entry, or whether new deposit addresses would replace the old ones.

Bitget stated its private keys were not compromised. Binance reported no evidence of a private key leak. Mercado Bitcoin did not provide a comparable assurance.

Bitquery recommends users avoid sending assets to old Mercado Bitcoin deposit addresses until the exchange confirms their safety, and to expect new addresses.

With the ability to sign from both hot wallets and deposit addresses, what happened to the $48.6 million?

Liquidation and Movement

The $48.6 million figure is based on token values at the time of the theft, not on actual realized proceeds.

Bitquery calculates token values at their price on exit, excluding tokens without a market price.

One example highlights valuation challenges: $1.21 million in EVA tokens on Arbitrum are included at quoted values, but the weekly trading volume is often less; removing this drops the loss estimate to $47.4 million. Liquidating such amounts at market prices would not be feasible.

61% of the loss was on Ethereum at $29.72 million. Bitcoin accounted for $8.30 million, Solana for $3.22 million, Stellar for $2.12 million, Arbitrum for $1.53 million, and Tron for $1.51 million. Smaller amounts were taken from Polygon, Avalanche, BNB Chain, XDC, and Base.

The first Ethereum transfer was a 2,852.07 ETH payment at 06:24:47 UTC in block 26325283, executed as a straightforward transfer.

Mercado Bitcoin Ethereum Hot Wallet: 0x5cc7787778b4d20a947dcc53b41f593cfd27d548

Attacker's Main EVM Address: 0xe485e7A70b1131216Cb47CA4555c4Bbb2C742478

2,852 ETH Transaction: 0xf447ad5114dd01d78847799bf82b34f9b2ac04b97bbc5a81370eb753fa81ff68

Stablecoins followed. Arkham traced $2.99 million in USDT and $2.24 million in USDC moving within minutes of the ETH transfer.

USDT Transfer (per Arkham, $2.99M): 0x041caa2acecd6c7629d4406b18b4c794846ca9d244db14a9b8886cd477b7db75

USDC Transfer (per Arkham, $2.24M): 0x5caca820a2aaafb3e3dfaa8679d4dd2cdc8b3255797afa15ddceaeb15951a3b3

At 06:41 UTC, 104.43 BTC was transferred from Mercado Bitcoin to the attacker. Bitquery described this as resembling a routine withdrawal.

Bitcoin Transfer (104.43 BTC): ada3bb2304be5de8dd7e67bf9be8c765c5f020a34508bd248f345a1205c5fcf9

Sums referenced in this case file

Attacker's BTC Address: 19qGpsHvzh1t6pVi526XNNkh6hW6prDZp

Asset-specific responses followed: some token issuers could freeze or recover funds, while bitcoin and ether could not be frozen by a central party.

Bitquery reports that $11.8 million in assets were frozen by five issuers, roughly 24% of the total stolen.

Mercado Bitcoin later reported over $15 million in frozen assets by November 4, higher than Bitquery's tally.

Tether led the freezes, blocking $5.9 million over four networks. On Solana, the attacker spent the hour prior to Tether’s 14:55 UTC freeze selling assets for USDT, with the last swap occurring one second before the freeze.

Attacker's Solana Address: 3YX6WHncP1Ra4AotE9YLawFt4nPmxyux288FWXkEW97J

Attacker's Tron Address: TEX3HuDRHRa3tnYpy96M4UfSx62VhDyA5L

Circle restricted $4.3 million in USDC and EURC beginning at 16:19 UTC, about six hours after Tether’s initial freeze. Circle at first froze EURC at an empty Ethereum wallet, leaving $400,000 in EURC at the attacker’s main address unfrozen until 00:55 UTC on November 4.

Wallet with 2.24M USDC, Frozen by Circle: 0x3ce76d2d27cc80e44c7d9532423633c7f940c779

Paxos froze PAXG and USDP, including 369 PAXG that had already been moved.

Wallet with PAXG, Frozen by Paxos: 0x3c6daf929ff36e50ceb66807ebe8abe83653e051

Agora froze $106,000 of AUSD, Ripple $39,000 in RLUSD. Synthetix went further, retrieving about $76,000 in SNX from the attacker's wallet. MetaMask USD blocked 34 attacker wallets by the following evening, which then held almost none of that token.

The attacker’s Stellar address held 6.71 million XLM (which Circle could not freeze), as well as USDC and EURC that were frozen.

Attacker's Stellar Address: GDXYRI6IONQA5YTGRLQ6O3FGJ2BWXPJTTQPUXFPSEXSRKBZLFKMZSOLP

Following the initial theft, the attacker continued to move assets.

By the afternoon of November 2, $19.5 million on Ethereum had been dispersed among ten fresh wallets. Overnight, 3,649 ETH (approx. $8.2 million) was consolidated into two new wallets.

Wallet (2,979 ETH overnight): 0x59a919e8d0582ce62c8de9431b3ebc6fa121731e

Wallet (670 ETH overnight): 0x071f8366375fdd21423bb23ae19e4b91f03f9270

Post-drain ETH (2,800 ETH, 12:07 UTC): 0x8419e7824e785c4ac8d9d94a0093c437ab1ff320

2,800 ETH Transfer: 0x49713cbd0582544cecbe1229336cee0d85be4dd57750df80d95881300d73dac7

Cross-chain movement continued: SOL and USDT were swapped for about $1.15 million in ETH via Mayan. Relay denied two orders.

Bridgers processed 1.71 million TRX (worth about $549,000), with one order fulfilled in eight minutes and another ($137,000) pending more than a day later.

The AVAX path included a small MetaMask bridge test, then 76,000 AVAX shifted to a new Avalanche address 90 seconds later.

Attacker's Avalanche Address (76,000 AVAX): 0x71ddbdd9b865d74b3c21068d71b3a11e110db728

76,000 AVAX Transfer: 0x1df5714bf287ff1e6a38582d82fb49764a72676f168d4a7f369c240ab2d572bc

On Polygon, the attacker’s address lacked POL for transaction fees, so unfrozen tokens remained temporarily stuck.

The attacker then began liquidating tokens: from 13:31 UTC on November 3 to 10:01 UTC on November 4, 136 different tokens were swapped via MetaMask for about $11.9 million in 398 trades. The largest trades involved PEPE, AAVE, and UNI.

The swaps produced 4,804 ETH (approx. $11 million), about $900,000 less than the quoted value of the tokens.

Tokens were typically sent to a new wallet before being sold; six of 33 such wallets ended up holding most of the ETH proceeds.

Wallet (1,275 ETH from sales): 0x469189223f286b51198163b4eb5a1e532669523d

Wallet (1,205 ETH from sales): 0xf666e184bb8d7b9724c1746e3621e72df4d3ce08

Wallet (1,178 ETH from sales): 0xbdd1369a581541e034c6b9790178d51e1013dab3

Collection Wallet (ETH from bridgers and sales): 0x4d5f3758938df94a76bfd19652f118ccd7a72c9d

On November 4, this collection wallet sent ETH to: 0x3dE1e4045aD112D8B807CD28dc4B8894DE935c49

Transfer Transaction: 0xd6046d6465f37f0cd4f81bc69b029e4294b5a9667251d683d7eb7930eb0abf01

By Bitquery’s last snapshot (between 10:02 and 10:08 UTC, November 4), the attacker held 8,678 ETH (about $20.1 million) across ten wallets.

The 106.07 BTC remains unmoved as of November 10: 19qGpsHvzh1t6pVi526XNNkh6hW6prDZp

The largest unsold position was $1.4 million in PENDLE.

About $100,000 had left these Ethereum wallets for other chains.

Bitquery observed no deposits of stolen funds to centralized exchanges during its monitoring period.

Funds were still being moved from the main Ethereum address on November 9.

The balances were still in motion.

The attacker’s address was not only active on Mercado Bitcoin; funds arrived from BitMart-linked wallets about an hour before the main theft.

Cross-Exchange Activity

The attacker’s activity began before targeting Mercado Bitcoin.

Bitquery traced approximately $298,000 entering the attacker’s address from Base, Arbitrum, and Optimism wallets, starting 53 minutes prior to the Mercado Bitcoin hack. The majority came from three wallets Bitquery associates with BitMart.

Bitquery’s labels identify the Arbitrum wallet as a BitMart hot wallet.

BitMart-Labeled Arbitrum Hot Wallet: 0xb4af4d0b9bd38c9f2fec9778e48667912f778f01

Arkham, meanwhile, identifies the Base wallet as a Mercado Bitcoin hot wallet, with a 0.0001 ETH test sent at 01:22 UTC.

Bitquery, referencing external data, disputes this label: the wallet’s history does not show Mercado Bitcoin deposit addresses as payers, and in 2024, the wallet interacted with a BitMart proof-of-reserves address.

Arkham’s label for the Base wallet: 0xc3F6b6c4309Ba9A9887216DbeBf39FAC78406696

The attacker returned to Base that night: At 20:20 UTC, 80 tokens left the wallet in six minutes; between 20:19 and 20:44 UTC, about 1,400 Base deposit addresses sent small amounts of ETH to the attacker.

On Arbitrum: 1,320 deposit addresses (three out of four labeled as BitMart’s by Bitquery) sent assets to the wallet involved in the Base sweep.

Smaller chains contributed about $30,000, valued as of November 3.

BitMart founder Sheldon confirmed the breach. On November 3, Sheldon acknowledged that BitMart was hacked the previous day, called the amount “small,” and said a preliminary review pointed to the group responsible for the Mercado Bitcoin breach.

Sheldon described a security team reduced by restructuring, with staff retention issues caused by threats, retaliation, and layoffs.

BitMart had announced its wind-down in July, with trading ending on August 26. In December 2021, it lost $196 million, a theft attributed by the former CEO to a stolen private key.

If Bitquery’s attribution is accurate, the attacker had signing authority at two exchanges in the same night.

A common vendor running wallet infrastructure for both exchanges is a possible explanation, but no shared supplier or entry point has been confirmed. Neither exchange has disclosed details on this issue.

Mercado Bitcoin, meanwhile, continued to reassure its clients.

On November 3, the exchange assured customers that assets were safe and balances remained in accounts. It reported $36.3 million in affected assets, with $12.9 million frozen, and reminded clients to avoid sharing credentials or sending funds.

On November 9, the platform announced that users could again check their balances and holdings online, with crypto balances reflecting positions as of November 2.

Trading, withdrawals, deposits, transfers, Pix, and card services remained unavailable at that time.

The next phase included account revalidation and Pix withdrawals to customers’ own accounts, with trading and crypto transfers to follow in subsequent stages.

The exchange had pledged to restore affected customer balances using its own funds. By November 9, it reported that replenishment was underway.

One element of reassurance referenced a notable investor.

Tether invested $20 million in Mercado Bitcoin in July 2026 to support expansion into tokenized assets and blockchain finance.

Tether was also the first issuer to freeze funds tied to the attack. Bitquery tracks $5.9 million frozen by Tether, with the first freeze occurring at 10:21 UTC—more than two hours before Mercado Bitcoin’s public disclosure.

By November 9, the exchange reported more than a third of the diverted assets frozen and confirmed that affected balances were being restored with company funds.

Frozen assets do not equal recovered funds. Bitquery recorded that Synthetix removed about $76,000 in SNX from the attacker’s wallet, but did not specify the recipient. Mercado Bitcoin has not clarified if this amount is included in its own figures.

The incident followed a major regulatory step: Mercado Bitcoin submitted its virtual-asset brokerage and custody application on October 27, ahead of the October 30 deadline.

No public information is available regarding the status of the application or any central bank response to the breach.

A practical concern remains regarding deposit addresses. Bitquery urges customers not to use old Mercado Bitcoin deposit addresses until further notice.

The exchange’s November 9 update indicates that crypto sent to valid MB addresses will be credited when transfers resume, but does not clarify whether new addresses will be issued.

Reopening was to start with access to account information, not with withdrawals. Pix withdrawals to customer-owned accounts were scheduled for the following week, after revalidation.

Crypto transfers and broader functionality would follow in later phases, with no fixed timeline.

When will customers regain withdrawal access?

On October 27, Mercado Bitcoin applied for a license as a virtual-asset intermediary and custodian.

Six days later, an attacker began extracting funds directly from customer deposit addresses.

The primary hot wallet drain lasted about 25 minutes; the Ethereum deposit sweep persisted for approximately four hours, extending beyond the exchange’s claim of rapid containment.

Bitquery estimates $48.6 million stolen across 11 blockchains, with $11.8 million frozen by issuers; as of its November 4 snapshot, most remaining funds were in wallets attributed to the attacker.

The exchange stated it was replenishing affected balances using its own capital, but the initial reopening on Monday only allowed balance viewing, not withdrawals. Pix withdrawals to customer accounts were scheduled for the following week after revalidation, while crypto transfers would resume later.

The initial announcement cited an event in “one of our systems,” without identifying which or specifying if compromised deposit keys had been replaced.

If Bitquery’s attribution linking BitMart holds, the same attacker gained signing capabilities at two exchanges in the same night, but no shared vendor or entry vector has been confirmed.

Custody is the very function Mercado Bitcoin sought regulatory approval to provide.

Can the exchange demonstrate that the attacker’s signing access has been fully revoked?

Mercado BitcoinOperational Security
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