CryptoReal
CASE FILE — Oct 26, 2026

Abracadabra's MIM Wind-Down: From Dollar Peg to Four Cents

Abracadabra has officially acknowledged the value of its dollar-pegged token: four cents.

Traditional magic tricks unfold in three acts: the pledge, the turn, and the prestige—where what disappears is restored.

Abracadabra's situation, however, omits the final act. The latest resolution for MIM holders offers only a small portion of the original dollar value, not the full amount once promised.

In June, two wallets cast the decisive votes for a governance proposal that installed a stewardship by an entity called Anubis. One of these wallets had previously received 1.6 billion SPELL from the treasury about fourteen months prior.

Treasury to Voter 1: 0x50d78c15b65c885093a5486b735e06570af3b5715391826ed8816adc990080f6

Just over a week following this vote, the Depeg Contingency Fund (DCF)— a 6 billion SPELL reserve created to defend the MIM peg in emergencies— transferred all its SPELL holdings in two major transactions on June 11 and June 17.

DCF to forwarder, June 11 (1,500,000,000 SPELL): 0xb536e74122c82d5b19cf0b0176ebfb6156fa3cd0ac4e26de773835526cb654c2

DCF to forwarder, June 17 (4,499,999,980 SPELL): 0xfb009066d191a0479943bc5a2840ace9dfed77a34cbc8b2015355f7f68a718d5

By late June, MIM was trading near $0.16 on Ethereum decentralized exchanges.

On June 25, the treasury minted three batches of SPELL—3 billion, 3 billion, and 2 billion—totaling 8 billion tokens.

Approximately 2.67 billion SPELL were then directed to each of three addresses: Those tied to Bybit, Gate, and an intermediary address that later sent tokens to MEXC.

By September, the author of the wind-down proposal held voting power that could be traced in part to assets transferred from the treasury.

The initial wind-down proposal did not achieve quorum. On a subsequent proposal, the treasury’s multisig wallet contributed approximately 75% of the affirmative voting power, as documented on October 14.

That proposal calculated around $900,000 of available assets to support roughly $22 million in external MIM holdings. The accounting did not reconcile the SPELL withdrawn from the peg reserve, the freshly minted SPELL, or the ETH and stablecoin outflows from July.

The plan attributes about $21 million of bad debt to various exploits, but there is no public breakdown connecting asset flows since June to this deficit.

If the treasury is involved in funding voters, casting the majority ballot, and proposing the payout, who truly controls the wind-down?

References: Bitquery, CoinTelegraph, DefiLlama, Abracadabra (MIM), Mikko Ohtamaa, Pharos, Curve, yearn

Abracadabra's foundation of trust was its stablecoin, MIM.

MIM launched in May 2021, backed by interest-bearing collateral in lending contracts known as Cauldrons. Its peg relied on sufficient collateral and deep liquidity, especially via Curve. By January 2022, deposits had exceeded $6.3 billion.

The peg had previously come under pressure. In June 2022, after the Terra UST collapse, MIM fell to about $0.93 amid claims of $12 million in bad debt linked to Terra.

Founder Daniele Sestagalli denied insolvency allegations, asserting treasury assets covered the outstanding debt.

In February 2024, the DAO established a risk reserve.

AIP 44 created the Depeg Contingency Fund, which was meant to reinforce the MIM peg under duress. 6 billion SPELL were allocated to a designated Safe.

Depeg Contingency Fund Safe: 0xC1C2F3eE323Ce42478c1c77BfCe09eAA5E7F72C2

This emergency reserve was established after the first of three significant exploits.

A January 2024 exploit resulted in a $6.5 million loss due to a rounding bug in cauldron logic.

In March 2025, another $13 million was lost on Arbitrum in GMX-linked cauldrons.

October 2025 saw $1.8 million drained when an outdated CauldronV4 contract permitted an attacker to borrow 1,793,755 MIM with no collateral.

Following the third event, the treasury intervened as expected: It repurchased the dumped MIM on the market.

Buyback transaction: 0xbaede1ddbab71fb48d25139e720356d8c487d47ce4b94aaf683969dc1fb1c984

The team claimed the buyback “completely reversed the effect of the attack.”

At that point, Abracadabra stated the treasury had fulfilled its role in defending MIM.

Eight months later, MIM experienced a new depegging crisis, the kind the contingency fund was designed for.

When the peg broke, who controlled the emergency reserve?

The Turn

In the second act, the trusted object disappears.

In early June 2026, 0xmerlin.eth introduced a “strategic transition and stewardship” proposal on Snapshot.

Proposal author (0xmerlin.eth): 0xfddfE525054efaAD204600d00CA86ADb1Cc2ea8a

The proposal aimed to revive Abracadabra’s DeFi status, promote growth, enhance governance, and provide a vision for SPELL’s future.

The plan included a new operational team: DAO governance would remain, but day-to-day operations, development, and treasury management would shift to Anubis.

Staff were named for specific roles, including Greg Dewitt (operations), Paul Parker and Glenn Kennedy (directors), and Jack Niewold (project lead). Alapin Holdings and dao5 were listed as partners, with Tekin Salimi noted as an adviser.

Two wallets cast votes for this transition, collectively surpassing quorum.

Voter 1: 0x93652aE25d0ba757c3C92A4Deb0b05dd1D4efE35

Voter 2: 0x350D87f94dC92EE81F896271500195E5B8E3680B

Together they supplied around 5.5 billion SPELL, exceeding the space’s 3 billion quorum. Neither could have succeeded alone. The vote closed on June 3.

The treasury was already familiar with one of these wallets.

On April 1, 2025, about 14 months before the vote, the treasury sent 1.6 billion SPELL to that wallet.

Treasury to Voter 1: 0x50d78c15b65c885093a5486b735e06570af3b5715391826ed8816adc990080f6

In March 2023, the shared Safe became jointly managed by the treasury and Voter 1.

Shared Safe: 0x559AED2EFD263d038D5D5c8695A0883680139695

Owners added: 0x17d4d72a12eccb4357cfdfd3e67e479a2394894716e2cdcc6a44018983acbfef

Threshold set to 2: 0xac96d09400227a2af0f5f2c3e5c4cb75751697f4f2d0989ddffd4f3338d58556

This shows the treasury both funded and shared control with a voting wallet.

Almost immediately, on June 4, four addresses received ETH from a Kraken-identified wallet and were then added as owners of the Depeg Contingency Fund the following day.

Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xfD694815E4038A03145B408553A5b06efd13D5F1: 0xd1a417b0fda898951ff9051df425b2c19f1520a595fe8962be4e0aeca1d9c90c

Kraken-labeled wallet to 0x557c58E7b76022FD99BE8F4688383963135972fb: 0x4872a73300286f6046c302bafbd9ba222fc88ed010fb9b333574b1e5f5254c67

Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xBF79E8CA5719C24AB606B9cB3Fa85C3c5fF339BB: 0xd61f812b259ef06bb2f4d164041a5f0fbb7e80e37270ae7964c618ad9cd00e7b

Kraken-labeled wallet to 0xA765C72712F0DeBFa0fd16564940f7A2c9E0eae1: 0x8d54ce6a897b36a18c90b98727520bd2b2746e1323ff9045ffd75396270e1047

On June 5, ownership of the fund changed in a single transaction: Three of these addresses replaced previous owners, and the fourth was added. Six days before the first significant transfer, control of the 6 billion SPELL reserve shifted.

Depeg Contingency Fund owner change: 0x6b0b415fc341b0fd7d1431bf7dfda87238b9a8d8bea2378d9439e751f4a17a67

On June 8, two transactions were proposed for approval in the fund’s Safe: A test payment at 15:23:30 UTC and a 1.5 billion SPELL transfer at 15:25:54 UTC.

An hour later, the treasury sold 200,000 MIM.

Treasury MIM sale: 0x98fac1d40697ff385d90c96eff90af401c372380babe9cc494651e55f2396101

Soon after, the reserve began moving.

Trading Strategy’s Mikko Ohtamaa later noted treasury MIM sales on June 8 and 11, raising about $0.5 million as the peg deteriorated.

June 11, 16:41 UTC: 1.5 billion SPELL was sent from the fund to a forwarder, which then passed it to a BitGo custody address.

Fund to forwarder: 0xb536e74122c82d5b19cf0b0176ebfb6156fa3cd0ac4e26de773835526cb654c2

Forwarder address: 0xDf09981A7D6F2D1f17211889B529C08C03b12e40

Forwarder to BitGo: 0x991057cd1031627af7ba2316623002dbf5717eaf3132aad56edab4c3119b541b

BitGo custody address: 0xbd02c51150a4ab6ce97b9de2025644594f3e75b8

June 17, 16:30 UTC: The remaining 4,499,999,980 SPELL followed, via a second forwarder, reaching the same BitGo address.

Fund to forwarder: 0xfb009066d191a0479943bc5a2840ace9dfed77a34cbc8b2015355f7f68a718d5

Forwarder address: 0xDf456c20161F115D715D94ac38497177F5044afE

Forwarder to BitGo: 0xe6b8a2c1711b934b208188b4879006ea7fd7982809b1d8e039ec20ee226085a2

Sums referenced in this case file

BitGo custody address: 0xbd02c51150a4Ab6Ce97B9de2025644594F3E75B8

In just six days, two bulk transfers—along with two test transactions—emptied the 6 billion SPELL reserve.

The “BitGo 1” label references custody infrastructure, not a specific client. The transfers confirm the assets reached that address but do not clarify who initiated them or what happened next.

During this period, public communications from the team focused on other matters.

On June 14, they stated a new Curve pool had been funded with $100,000 in MIM, USDT, and USDC after “unexpected liquidity withdrawals,” with liquidity restoration described as the “highest operational priority.”

By June 17, the entirety of the peg fund’s 6 billion SPELL had exited.

On June 18, the team reported deploying 70 million SPELL to incentivize Curve’s MIM-2Pool as part of efforts to rebuild liquidity.

On June 24, emergency measures were announced: borrowing rates would rise, and incentives would be paused until MIM regained its peg.

The next day, the treasury minted 8 billion new SPELL across three transactions.

Abracadabra Treasury: 0xDF2C270f610Dc35d8fFDA5B453E74db5471E126B

Mint, 3 billion SPELL: 0x47eaeffe7b61c71d8133030f91f46cefd3b80a91dbdfbd526f617cebd51e60e7

Mint, 3 billion SPELL: 0x468aad102e2cf23511b749bb2d90f98fd18576460ef5ae31486df5324b40f1e5

Mint, 2 billion SPELL: 0xe5e7aea7c9484690f2d2349374051ee4c8e540fb3f5803326774e0c6a85b950d

About 2.67 billion SPELL was sent to each of three destinations: Bybit, Gate, and an intermediary that then sent tokens to MEXC.

To Bybit (0x9390021c7Ef8a20E966ee5aA53f87Df8B286A386): 0x6a216ee8bb41e55464e4f10a44f2692f0c458f2fbe5661db7ccf3b74fc72cfc5

To Gate (0x769E4e225DA686986D8ddc8BcD4fa8d3Bf046A60): 0x9878705039b60c4e25653c7295a896ad45a7f6785bd559dc0d545b1c80748182

To intermediary (0x53F39C473a1574399d39dE5f912e4BB16732ef89): 0xf66a8b2007d0918bd02c3f88491f0d5194e9f65377e5bb62a479738290a92c21

Intermediary to MEXC (0x3cc936b795a188f0e246cbb2d74c5bd190aecf18): 0xab3092a02c0538070c42f9e66e1c8f0e7f2720c17a29a86996743eda49b46c6d

On July 5, the team referred to a plan to restore the peg, promising a detailed roadmap soon.

No further updates were posted on Twitter after that point.

While public updates ceased, transaction activity continued. Nine days later, treasury Safes transferred roughly 2,142 ETH and WETH from Arbitrum and Ethereum treasuries to a Binance deposit address.

Binance deposit address: 0x1b20b200a78c6068ce5ea96226d1b53e0a119202

Arbitrum, 1,731 ETH: 0xda3eb8b67d6863647e756331b7a843051b1dcd4afe7db61bc6393af2d55e657c

Ethereum, 366.677 ETH: 0x45b0bbffeeae3f54a4de8bf6d786ba68c87b60abb856930d4f88c025ad7ed976

Ethereum, 44.665 WETH: 0x089387036aeb42f4abc8795ac694cfa61d7ef635f5827f38fab7ade106fee630

On July 14, an additional 3,793,188.187079 USDC left the Arbitrum treasury, routed through intermediaries to a Coinbase deposit address. The final deposits combined balances, making exact tracking complex.

First intermediary address: 0x0E533b4eeDD5bb6049b9C2203a4eeAA3d9e39079

Second intermediary address: 0xdb16610262EaF78871B0f912d8FB725fd10a6b64

Coinbase deposit address: 0x7907815069e96001e22954b9d55cd000b35dbca5

The Avalanche treasury separately transferred 82,047.752950 USDt to a Binance deposit, which sent the same sum to “Binance Hot Wallet 10.”

Binance deposit address: 0x1b20b200a78c6068ce5ea96226d1b53e0a119202

Avalanche treasury to Binance deposit: 0x80382a8d35dc96dc45bf5a6a2fa722e74e02d2e10361a8fed4d5d884b9f6c01f

Binance deposit to Binance Hot Wallet 10: 0x8046574f029b717d06ec054eaac05a5a25cf2e4c30ceae9c695852ce107cb27d

A further 504,253.194709 USDT left the Ethereum treasury, ending up with an unidentified EIP-7702 account.

Ethereum treasury to first intermediary: 0x290ecc4b8f51acce6fcd1b3e83432e4ad4766f287d6c00856c98fa6696f57703

Through intermediaries, final recipient: 0x755bc7104b98EA061197bE76D1E49fA84e3E702f

Pharos noted these outflows, estimating about $8.3 million in treasury assets, without any public justification.

The anticipated recovery plan did not materialize. Instead, about eleven weeks after these July movements, a wind-down proposal was introduced.

Who controlled the voting on this wind-down?

The Prestige

The final act typically restores what was lost.

For holders of MIM, what returned was only an estimated payout.

The process began with the wallet that would draft the wind-down proposal.

Wind-down proposal author: 0xE843FaEa0E6100900e591E89Be04b07285A59A58

On September 24, the treasury sent approximately 2.906 steCRV to this wallet.

Treasury to proposal author: 0x389ebd4ecb8b7094bf7a0f32429fa0b45ca3a46f27ad99f077861b852e2bc77a

Three days later, the treasury sold 900,000 MIM for 4,138.817068 USDC, roughly $0.0046 per token.

Treasury MIM sale (September 27): 0x4452d575722824beb6408169ccb3278c6424e925355b63e39b3445248d5b79b6

The next day, 4,138.817168 USDC and 1.314494852 ETH were transferred to the proposal author, who then used these to acquire a total of 100,047,420.511 SPELL and staked them.

Purchase and stake transactions:

About seven hours after these transactions, the wind-down proposal was published.

The proposal author’s wallet then voted in favor with around 100 million SPELL.

The proposal positioned MIM as a senior liability over SPELL, and stated that SPELL would only have value if the MIM liability was fully satisfied. The team described the situation as "far worse than initially expected."

The proposal estimated total collateral backing MIM at roughly $1.2 million. About $300,000 was locked in an Arbitrum WETH cauldron with a fixed interest rate, leaving roughly $900,000 as actionable against about $22 million in MIM outside protocol control.

The plan outlined that eligible collateral would be liquidated, converted to WETH, and distributed by Merkl contract. Borrowers would receive collateral minus debt (valued at $1 per MIM), and MIM holders would split the remaining assets, amounting to an estimated $0.04 per MIM.

This four-cent figure was about 8.7 times the treasury’s implied sale price from September 27.

Another wallet voted against, representing about 523,446 SPELL.

The vote closed September 30 with two votes totaling around 100.57 million voting power, just 3.35% of the 3 billion quorum.

A revised proposal expanded voter eligibility and set a proposal-specific quorum. The main new voter was the treasury Safe, which, by October 14, accounted for nearly 75% of the supporting votes.

The updated proposal required more than 309 million votes, about 30% of a defined “available” voting supply, but Snapshot still showed a 3 billion quorum, with only 13.2% met at capture.

The proposal stated that the quorum setting was unchangeable, since the previous administrators were unreachable.

Without the treasury’s participation, the proposal would not have met its own threshold.

The treasury supplied assets to help the author’s voting power, and later provided the bulk of support for the revised proposal. The estimated recovery remained at four cents per MIM.

This estimate was not a guarantee. Nor did meeting the threshold clarify the independence of the process: Who approved the treasury’s support for the author and the proposal?

While a magician conceals the method, in this case, the process itself is part of what’s missing.

The Method

There is always a method—here, the transfers are on-chain, but the reconciliation is not.

Much of the documentation referenced was compiled by a Curve MIM liquidity provider and shared with Rekt News.

Though the author is a claimant, the transaction data is verifiable. However, tracing asset flows does not alone reveal their purpose.

The crucial missing element is a reconciliation: 6 billion SPELL exited the peg fund, another 8 billion were minted and sent to exchanges, and about 2,142 ETH/WETH plus over $4 million in stables left treasury Safes.

There is no public explanation connecting these outflows to the $900,000 defined as actionable collateral. The asset transfers alone do not confirm remaining recoverable assets, nor clarify how the four-cent figure was determined.

AIP 44 was supposed to define the reserve’s rules. According to the dossier, none of the 97 proposals reviewed afterward explicitly authorized the fund’s deployment, although the review was limited to available archives.

The Safe’s signer record shows 0xmerlin.eth’s address—the June proposal’s author—among the five signers for the first 1.5 billion SPELL transfer. The subsequent 4.5 billion SPELL was approved by the same new owners plus one original, unverified owner.

Who controlled these wallets, and under whose authority were these transfers made?

The June proposal listed names and roles, but this does not confirm who controlled the signing wallets or sanctioned the transfers.

Questions remain for holders whose recovery is uncertain.

Liquidity providers in the Curve MIM/3Crv pool receive pool tokens (MIM-3LP3CRV-f), not direct MIM balances. The pool pairs MIM with the 3Crv LP token. Yearn’s now-retired vault added complexity, accepting pool tokens and issuing vault shares. Neither the original nor the revised proposals specified how these indirect holders would be treated.

Outstanding issues involve instructions, authority, and complete accounting: What communications guided the owner changes on June 5? What governance supported each fund deployment? What was the purpose of minting 8 billion SPELL, and how were proceeds used? Who benefited from the July transfers? How was the $900,000 figure determined? Who authorized the treasury’s ballot, and who now has admin control over the Snapshot space?

A transaction hash confirms movement, but not the rationale.

If holders are to accept the wind-down’s figures, they need the accounting behind those numbers.

The story’s final act has not yet played out for MIM holders.

Originally, the promise was clear: one MIM would always equal one dollar.

A 6 billion SPELL fund was established to protect this peg.

The major changes occurred in a single summer: Two wallets approved a stewardship shift, control of the reserve changed hands, 6 billion SPELL left between June 11–17, 8 billion more were minted, and July saw ETH and stablecoins leave the treasury.

Each transfer left a trace, but an overall reconciliation is still absent.

The proposed wind-down offered about $900,000 in actionable assets, estimating a recovery of four cents per MIM. The treasury helped support the voter, and supplied most of the voting support as of October 14.

The plan would see MIM holders receive what remains—after the treasury had previously sold 900,000 MIM for around 0.46 cents each.

While the proposal cites exploit-driven bad debt, it does not directly reconcile these with the reserve outflows.

The blockchain provides transparency for the transfers. The missing element is the explanation for their purpose, outcomes, and the calculation of what, if anything, is left.

When transactions are on-chain, but the underlying accounting is lacking, what assurance remains for those still holding MIM?

AbracadabraGovernanceMIM
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